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Transition started by a sudden collapse of corporate efficiency, as one important element of 
the transformational recession. It was followed by a consolidation period, with rapidly 
increasing efficiency and improving returns to scale. During this period performance was 
frequently improved by downsizing, thus fast improving corporate performance could not be 
translated into economic growth. This consolidation period ended in 1995-6, after that mean 
firm level efficiency only changed slowly. However, the March 1995 stabilization created a 
favourable environment for substantial investments into the Hungarian corporate sector. 
These investments largely increased the market share of the better performing firms and 
sectors, and the massive investments, together with substantial structural improvements 
brought about rapid economic growth. 
Market characteristics play a changing role during transition. Import competition, sectoral 
concentration and efficiency are important explanatory factors for the development of market 
share of a firm. Heterogeneity can be observed across sectors, according to ownership and to 
size. The differences, however, are not that large and were diminishing, what makes the 
hypothesis of the importance of market environment in the determination of corporate 
performance plausible. 
One of the major tasks facing a transition economy is to create the competitive environment 
of a properly functioning market economy. This paper attempts to analyse the relationship of 
market structure, market imperfections and corporate performance by mark-up pricing. Our 
results clearly indicate that substantial market imperfections exist in the Hungarian 
manufacturing sector. These imperfections can yield substantial rents. However, foreign 
owned firms have larger chance for exploiting market imperfections and can collect larger 
rents than domestic firms. 
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Introduction 
Transition from planned to market economy is a unique possibility to study interactions of 
different policies. The recession phase had already been described by Kornai (1993), and 
excellent theoretical studies are available on different models of restructuring. However, 
much fewer studies investigate the interactions of different policies in different periods of 
transition, from recession to growth. Aghion, Carlin and Schaffer (2002) is an important 
contribution in providing insights into this interaction, based on an in-depth firm level survey 
for a large number of transition economies.  
Our objective in this paper is to investigate such interactions for a single country, using firm 
level balance sheet data. We aim to explore the dynamics of the transition process as well as 
the possibility of heterogeneous behavioural responses according to sectors, ownership and 
size. 
This paper assesses different aspects of transition in Hungary: efficiency, pricing, resource 
reallocation and the role of market. The first part describes the theoretical background. The 
second part deals with the notions and the links among them. The third part presents the 
detailed analysis of the Hungarian economy. The fourth part attempts to describe the role of 
different policies. Then conclusions follow. 
Theoretical background 
The drive for efficiency in corporate sector can be modeled in different ways. The X-
efficiency way of reasoning claims that greater competition induces an expansion of output 
by incumbent firms through improved internal technical efficiency without any reallocation 
of resources across firms. (Cf, Horn, Lang and Lundgren, 1995). The incentive type 
explanation argues that incentive schemes for managers will generate better results the 
greater the number of players (firms) involved because of greater opportunities for 
performance comparison. See Holmström (1982), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983). 
The industrial rationalization argument postulates that firms compete for market share in an 
oligopolistic environment (Schmidt, 1997). In transition economies, increased competition 
may have negative effect on efficiency. Competition creates incentives for breaking contracts 
when institutions are weak (Blanchard and Kremer, 1997). 
The link between product market competition (PMC) and innovation depends on the nature 
of the market. If the capital market is perfect as it is assumed in Romer (1990) or Aghion and 
Howitt (1992), the effect of PMC is negative on innovation what is only determined by the 
monopoly rent emanating from it. This conclusion is contradicted by empirical studies like 
Nickell (1996), Blundell et al. (1999) and Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith and Howitt 
(2002) for UK and by Carlin, Fries, Schaffer and Seabright (2001) and Grosfeld and Tressel 
(2001) for transition economies. 
Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1999) developed a model that is consistent with this empirical 
finding. In the model two types of firms exist; profit-maximizing ones and non-profit 
maximizing ones with ‘satisficing’ managers who minimize effort subject to remaining in 
business, in order for them to preserve their private benefits of control. Firms with dispersed 
outside ownership are good candidates for this type of managerial behavior. 
The model predicts that better corporate governance, as measured by higher managerial 
stakes in the firm’s monetary profits or by a higher debt-asset ratio and higher enforcement 
power by creditors, tends to reduce the impact of product market competition on growth. 
However, that is in contradiciton with Grosfeld and Tressel (2001). The authors report for   3 
Polish firms listed on Warsaw Stock Exchange that PMC raises TFP growth and that the 
effect is stronger for firms with both concentrated and relatively dispersed ownership. 
There is a different way how to model the innovation process. Aghion, Harris, Howitt and 
Vickers (2001) and Aghion and Howitt (2002) assume that incumbent firms can also 
innovate. In earlier endogenous growth models, innovation was done only by outside firms or 
by the most backward ones. In this framework, innovation incentives depend upon the 
difference between post-innovation and pre-innovation rents and not so much upon post-
innovation rents only. Competition and hard budget constraints are complementary in this 
model. Aghion, Carlin and Schaffer (2002) lends empirical support to this model on a large 
sample of firms from transition economies. 
The link between PMC and efficiency is in the centre of this paper. As we do not have any 
direct information on R&D – either input or output sides – innovations are only present 
indirectly. Annual estimation of best practice technologies measures the distance of all firms 
from production frontier, hence gives an indirect measure of the efficiency of resource 
allocations, thus on R&D activities. Corporate governance may exacerbate this link, therefore 
it is represented by different measures in our empirical approach. Restructuring as a 
precondition for efficiency improvement is proxied by job reallocation. 
Policies are still difficult to be addressed, just as in case of estimations based on survey data. 
They are analysed in the framework of a market share model, where different market 
characteristics and firm efficiency are supposed to provide sufficient explanation. 
Some important empirical results 
Davis and Haltiwanger (1997) compare job creation and destruction rates of several transition 
economies to those in developed economies. Only the Czech Republic had job reallocation 
rates comparable to market economies in the initial phase of transition; job creation rates 
were extremely low in all other transition economies, typically at around 1%. Konings (2003) 
finds that some successfully restructuring transition economies (especially Poland and 
Slovenia with 13% excess reallocation ratio) gradually approached the intensity of job 
reallocation rates of the developed economies by the late 1990's, but many had still low job 
turnover, and some less successfully restructuring transition economies (eg, Bulgaria and 
Romania) were characterised by net job destruction even in the late 1990’s. This inflexibility 
is a clear indication on the poor performance of these transition economies, but it also is an 
impediment on the process of corporate restructuring. 
Djankov and Murrell (2002) present an impressive survey of the empirical evidence on the 
relationship of privatisation and the emerging ownership structure and productivity. Their 
most robust conclusion was that outside ownership leads to faster and larger productivity 
gains that insider or state ownership. However, as mentioned earlier, this finding was 
qualified by Grosfeld and Tressel (2001), suggesting that the concentration of the ownership 
structure also has a strong influence on efficiency. 
Two recent studies compare productive efficiency of transition economies to that of 
developed market economies. It is no surprise that ‘western’ firms are more efficient, and 
they determine the efficiency frontier. However, Loecker (2002) found that the productivity 
gap between Belgian and Czech or especially between Belgian and Polish firms is small, and 
the gap decreased relatively rapidly in the second half of the 1990's. Funke and Rahn (2002) 
seems to have found much more substantial efficiency difference (approximately twice as 
large gap) between Eastern and Western German firms than the gap between the Eastern and 
the Western firms in Loecker (2002), and the efficiency gap only seems to narrow in the   4 
engineering in Germany, but not in the other sectors. Even though there are important 
differences in model specification and data definitions, thus these results are not directly 
comparable, it is intriguing how large the efficiency gap between West and East Germany has 
remained, despite the fact that institutional changes were more thorough in Eastern Germany 
than in any other transition economy, and Eastern Germany received a much larger financial 
investment from the west throughout the 1990's than all other transition economies put 
together. This demonstrates the lack of a straightforward relationship between investment 
inflow and efficiency. Obviously, investment is one of the main factors of productivity 
growth, but a reasonable mix of macro-economic conditions is an essential precondition for 
efficiency improvement. The highly distorted macro-economic terms of German unification 
seems to have a lasting and substantial negative effect on efficiency catch-up of the East 
German economy. 
Konings, Van Cayseele and Warzynski (2002) analyses the relationship between mark-up 
ratios and ownership structure in Bulgarian and Romanian manufacturing. They found clear 
evidence that foreign-owned firms have higher mark-ups than domestic ones. (Interestingly, 
they also found that state owned firms had the lowest average mark-up ratio.) They also 
found evidence import penetration brings down mark-ups in highly concentrated sectors. 
Methods 
Four different methods will be used together in order to assess the depth and width of 
economic transformation in Hungary between 1990 and 2000. 
Restructuring 
The magnitude of gross job destruction and job creation and their balance is used as the first 
indicator of restructuring economic activity. It is assumed that the higher the turnover rate – 
average of creation and destruction rates – in employment the deeper the restructuring itself. 
For the overall employment and growth, however, the net effect – the difference between 
destruction and creation – matters. Gross job creation rate is the sum of employment at new 
firms of the sector, plus the surplus employment at those firms in the same sector where 
employment increased, relative to the total sectoral employment. Gross job destruction is 
defined analogously, while net job creation is the difference of the above gross measures. 
Efficiency 
We measure corporate efficiency by using a frontier production function. We assume that 
technology can be described by a Cobb-Douglas production function. As firms had to adjust 
production to very rapidly changing market conditions, while frequently had to face strong 
liquidity constraint, we used dynamic models to allow for gradual adjustment: 
log(Y)t = c + d * log(Y)t-1 + a * log(L)t + b * log(K)t + vt - ut,     
where Y is real value added (output), L is employment, K is capital stock, v the usual 
regression disturbance, while u measures productive inefficiency (u>0). 
Efficient firms use resources more productively. We measure relative (in)efficiency by the 
frontier production function: the ‘best practice’ firm is the benchmark. Differences in the 
average efficiency of specific groups of firms may reflect differences in endowment levels, 
market conditions as well as managerial effort. 
We also assume that the returns to scale measures firms' efficiency in optimally allocating 
resources. Suboptimal resource allocation may lead to substantial waste, and thus losses.   5 
Market structure and efficiency 
Efficiency and changes in market structure can be related to each other in both directions. 
Nickell (1996) and Nickell et al (1997) assume that competition and policies affect resource 
allocation directly. Hay and Liu (1997) on the other hand assume a reverse relationship:  
resource allocation determines the technical efficiency of firms, and this technical efficiency 
will affect the market share of firms in conjunction with variables describing the market 
environment, policies included. They also relate efficiency to investment. 
Halpern and Kőrösi (2001) found little evidence for a direct effect of market structure on 
corporate efficiency. However, efficiency proved to be an important factor influencing 
market share. The following relationship is assumed: 
St = d0 + d1 * St -1 + d2a * ua + d2b * ub + d3 * CNt + d4 * ICt + et , 
where S stands for the market share of the firm, ua for its own efficiency, ub for that of its 
competitors, CN for market concentration, and for IC import penetration. We assume that 
efficient firms gain market share, however, their ability in doing so is limited by their 
competitors efficiency, as well as by import competition. 
Mark-up pricing 
We also analyse market structure with a different method: we estimate sectoral price mark-
ups. Following Hall (1988), mark-ups are used to measure the consequences of oligopolistic 
price setting. Under perfect competition in an efficient market, firms set their prices at their 
marginal costs. Deviations from perfect competition and/or perfect markets can be identified 
by the discrepancy between prices and marginal costs. Hence, relaxing the assumption of 
perfect market competition allows analysing different pricing behaviour and policies of the 
firms. If the demand curve slopes downward, a monopolist may shift the equilibrium point: 
p = µ mc    
where p is product price, mc is marginal cost and µ is the mark-up ratio (µ  > 1). The 
consequence is the formation of a price mark-up, when the equilibrium price exceeds 
marginal cost. Roeger (1995) solved the most important measurement problem inherent in 
Hall’s model by using the Solow residual of both the production function of the firm and that 
of the corresponding cost function. We assume that productive technology is reasonably 
represented by a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale. In the case 
of perfect competition the rate of change of total factor productivity is: 
sj =  d yi – α (d li) –  (1– α ) (d ki), 
where Yi is the output of firm i, L is labour, K is the capital stock, lower case indicates 
logarithms, “d” denotes the (logarithmic) differences, and α is the elasticity of output with 
respect to labour, which is by definition equal to the share of labour costs in the firm’s 
revenue.  If the firm operates under imperfect competition and prices deviate from marginal 
costs, the Solow residual of can also be decomposed into: 
si =  B (d yi – d ki) + (1 – B) dti , 
where dti measures the change in productive efficiency and B is the Lerner index: B=1–1/µ. 
Similarly, the Solow residual, derived from the cost function under imperfect competition: 
s*i = – d pi + α (d wi) + (1– α ) (d ri) = – B (d pi – d ri) + (1 – B) dti 
where  Pi, Wi and Ri denote firm’s price, labour and capital costs. Taking the difference of the 
two equations:   6 
si – s*i = B [(d yi + d pi) –  (d ki + d ri) ] + εi .  
Under perfect competition B = 0 (µ=1). As the bracketed expression can be computed from 
measured variables, the test for perfect markets is equivalent to testing the B = 0 null 
hypothesis. We also analyse the relationship of market structure and mark-ups by using a 
varying coefficient model. We assume that the Lerner index (B) is a function of variables 
describing some important characteristics of the market position of the firm: market 
concentration, import competition, and ownership structure. We assume that concentration 
will increase the probability of mark-ups, strong import competition limits them, while 
foreign ownership may indicate excessive power of the firm, not measured at the domestic 
market. 
Three periods in 1990’s 
According to three different indicators – GDP, productivity and efficiency – the Hungarian 
development in the 1990s can be divided into three subperiods. (See Figure 1) During the 
recession these indicators moved very closely together with a sharp decline in 1991 and a fast 
recovery in the next year. GDP growth became positive in 1994, while productivity and 
efficiency had already increased in 1992.  Falling external demand, rapidly increasing 
(mostly import) competition and deep structural changes (bankruptcy and accounting system 
reforms) were the main forces leading to this substantial loss in economic activity.
4 As a 
consequence large number of jobs were destructed. 
The recession was followed by a consolidation period, with occasional reversals of economic 
policy. It is known that different factors – political business cycle (elections in 1994), and 
macroeconomic mismanagement – explain the relatively low growth rate after a successful 
corporate restructuring (banking sector included). They also contributed to the necessity of 
the March 1995 stabilization package. The results of deep restructuring, including accelerated 
privatisation of former state-owned enterprises, and reforms coupled with restored 
macroeconomic equilibrium appeared in 1996-7, when net job creation became positive and 
the growth rate accelerated. 
Finally, GDP growth rate increased to around 5% from 1997. This can be labelled as growth 
period. Net job creation, increasing efficiency, higher returns to scale. 
Recession (1990-2) 
We do not have data for this period on job creation-destruction. If we extrapolate from the 
curvature of Figure 2 backward, much larger job destruction with smaller creation, hence 
higher then 10% net destruction can be hypothesized. It can be partly supported by the 
employment data, as in 1992 employment fell by 15% in our corporate sample (see Table 8 
and Table 9).
5 Aggregate employment fell by 12.5% in 1992. 
Transformational recession was accompanied by asymmetric adjustment of employment to 
output prospects: downward elasticities were much higher than upward elasticities, indicating 
the combined effect of initial slack in employment and strong pessimism on the growth 
prospects of the firms. (See Kőrösi, 1997) 
                                                 
4 See Halpern and Wyplosz (1998). 
5 On the basis of a much smaller sample the employment fall peaked in 1992 and was double digit since 1989. 
(See Table 6 and Table 7.) Firms with positive output growth have never reduced the employment by more than 
7%.   7 
Efficiency closely followed the pattern of labour productivity and growth, as it reached the 
bottom in 1991, meaning that the average distance from the best practice firm was the largest. 
That heterogeneity can be illustrated by the large efficiency difference across sectors in 1990-
2. (See Figure 7 and Figure 8). Size (Figure 9) and ownership –(Figure 10) disaggregation 
points to the same direction: the difference between the least efficient firm and the best one is 
the largest in these early years. Further disaggregation reveals an interesting temporary 
reversal, as large foreign owned firms were less efficient in 1992-3 than their domestic 
counterparts. (See Figure 11 and Figure 12.) 
It is no surprise that the other measure of efficiency – the return to scale – is not significantly 
different from the average distance from the firm on the frontier. Large variations and much 
lower values can be observed during the early 1990’s. (See Figure 13 and Figure 14.) 
Consolidation (1993-6) 
Firm and bank restructuring created the necessary microeconomic conditions for sustainable 
growth. Large number of company exits and break-ups, together with substantial FDI inflow 
shaped the new industrial structure. That turbulent period can be characterised by more than 
20% gross job destruction and creation with net job loss still dominating. The trend, however, 
was towards a stabilization of these rates somewhere between 10 and 15 per cent. Mining and 
energy sector was an exception: job creation decreased much faster, and was below 10% 
already in 1995. (See Figure 4.) On the opposite side, Engineering and Services turned to net 
job creators in 1995 and 1996, respectively. (See Figure 5 and Figure 6.) 
Efficiency differences moderated from two sides, by the catching up of the least efficient 
groupings – agriculture, light industries, medium sized firms, especially domestic owned – 
and the most efficient ones – Services, Chemistry – declining. Explanations are different, 
foreign firms have somewhat reduced monopoly rents in different sectors, and market 
possibilities were fundamentally changed. 
Returns to scales were growing and getting very close to unity in almost all sectors. 
According to ownership classification this general increase was mainly due to domestic 
private and other owners (non-foreign, non-state and non-domestic private). Differences in 
size dimension show that small firms were behind this important increase, their overall return 
to scale went up to 1.17 in 1996 from 0.73 in 1993. 
Growth (1997-2000) 
GDP growth rates varied between 4.2 and 5.2% in this period. Accordingly, net job creation 
was positive in general, however, employment growth obviously was inhomogeneous: for 
example, in mining and energy sector the net loss was increasing and reached 10% in 2000. 
On the other hand, engineering had 12.9% net job creation rate in 2000. 
Efficiency improved only marginally after the consolidation period. The tendency of 
difference reduction has continued. State owned firms became the least efficient by the end of 
this period. Mean inefficiency consists of two different components, individual and 
compositional effects. Our hypothesis is that compositional effect might dominate the 
individual one. Foreign firms were always the most efficient ones since 1993. Surprisingly, 
domestic firms achieved the same level by 2000. Besides the compositional effects it is not 
obvious whether domestic firms acquired the necessary skill or foreign firms lost their rent 
possibilities. Both might have happened. 
Combining ownership and size criteria we can observe a long-term trend of catching up in 
case of small and medium sized firms between foreign and domestic owners. (See Figure 12.)   8 
Large firms had the opposite tendency: foreign firms increased their advantage between 1993 
and 1999. However, there is a substantial reversal in 2000, as the difference was reduced to 
almost zero. It is not yet clear, whether it is just an outlier or a new trend has emerged. 
Sectors have had increasing returns to scale with a very few exceptions. Astonishingly small 
difference can be observed across ownership groups. Large firms had fluctuating returns to 
scale varying between 0.5 and 0.7 following cyclical pattern, while the other two size groups 
had slightly increasing trend with less variation in case of medium size firms. 
It is noteworthy that the differentiation of firms continued unabated after 1997 despite the 
rapid economic growth. (See Table 8) While a large number of firms could increase their 
output very substantially from year to year (by an average 25-35%), an almost equal number 
of firms had to downsize production, and their average loss of output was by no means 
negligible (15-20%). This clearly indicates that structural adjustment was a continuing 
process throughout the 1990’s. 
Policies and markets 
Three issues will be treated, the relationship between pricing and markets, the link between 
efficiency and markets and the interaction between different policies. 
Pricing and markets 
First, we present the simple panel estimates for the mark-up ratios for the consolidation and 
growth periods. (See Table 3.) Mark-ups are significantly different from unity in all 
manufacturing sectors in both subperiods, as prices exceed marginal costs by 30-40% on 
average. There are some variations in the mark-up ratios between the two periods, but there 
does not seem to be any substantial change in any direction. 
In the second step varying coefficient models were estimated for the same two periods. 
Import competition, foreign ownership and relative standard deviation of sales as a measure 
of concentration were used. The results are presented in Table 4 and Table 5. These variables 
are jointly significant in most sectors according to the Wald-test. 
Interestingly, while concentration was less important in explaining corporate performance, it 
seems to be quite an important market structure variable enabling companies to charge prices 
in excess of their marginal costs. 
Import penetration was the least controversial variable. In principle, it should have a negative 
impact on mark-ups and there is only one exception (NACE 37 in 1997-2000). Its role 
increased marginally in the second period. 
An alternative possibility is that market imperfections are related to ownership. Ownership 
causes very characteristic differences in corporate efficiency; it may also be related to market 
imperfections. Ownership structure may obviously influence the ability of firms to exploit 
market imperfections. However, sample sizes in many sectors are too small for further 
disaggregation. So instead of exploring structural breaks similarly to studying efficiency 
differences, we alternatively assumed that the mark-up of prices over marginal costs depends 
on ownership variables, too.  
Ownership seems to matter for many sectors, although not for all. Foreign owned firms tend 
to have higher mark-ups than other firms, while – surprisingly – domestic private firms seem 
to have lower mark-ups on the average than other firms in the same sector. 
Our results clearly indicate that substantial market imperfections exist in the Hungarian 
manufacturing sector. These imperfections can yield substantial rents. However, foreign   9 
owned firms have larger chance for exploiting market imperfections and can collect larger 
rents than domestic firms. 
Efficiency and market 
Two aspects of efficiency may affect firm’s performance in our approach, its own and that of 
competitors. Own efficiency had always the expected positive effect on market share. We 
expect that the competitors’ efficiency have negative instantaneous effect. That was the case 
especially in the second half of the decade, what permits to infer the increasing role of 
competition. There was one group, state owned firms, for which the positive link between 
efficiency and market share ceased to exist since 1998. 
Import competition had negative effect on market shares. It means that import and domestic 
supplies were substitutes. That effect was significant in manufacturing and in the whole 
corporate sector between 1996 and 1999. There was no such effect in 2000. 
Concentration increases market share. That was dominantly the case during the consolidation 
period. In 1999-2000 that effect did not prevail in the manufacturing sector. 
State owned firms are the least efficient. Their market share is not affected by import 
competition, by sectoral concentration or by efficiency after 1997. Their efficiency, however, 
is positively correlated with both profit and investment rates. 
Small firms were the most efficient. Market share is reacting to all variables in the expected 
ways. There is a positive correlation between profitability and efficiency, but the link 
between efficiency and investment is missing. Both relations exist for medium sized firms. 
Interaction of policies 
The conclusion that emerges from analytical literature (Tybout 2000) is that almost anything 
can happen when a country protects its manufacturers, depending on the assumptions. One of 
the empirical issues is the relationship between openness and pricing behaviour. In our 
exercise we found negative and somewhat strengthening relationship. It can be interpreted in 
a standard way: foreign competition squeezes monopoly rents, or put differently, it 
disciplines the pricing behaviour of domestic producers. No doubt, alternative interpretation 
is also possible, when the increased import penetration is induced by currency real 
appreciation, which exerts downward pressure on output prices. We can, however, borrow 
some support for the first argument from the ownership effect, as foreign ownership has an 
important positive effect on mark-up. That calls for further investigation as pricing might be 
related to intra-firm trade via transfer pricing, which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Trade liberalization is thought to be associated with rising efficiency levels. The standard 
interpretation is that foreign competition drives inefficient domestic producers to exploit 
scale economies, eliminate waste, adopt best practice technologies, or shut down. This is 
challenged by the coincidence of reduced productivity dispersion and fall in mark-up. When 
efficiency is associated with low dispersion improvements in productivity, it cannot be 
distinguished from the mark-up squeeze due to trade liberalization. Or the other way around, 
when trade liberalization goes together with devaluation, the favourable price increase for 
tradables drives profitability upwards. This looks like an increase in efficiency, if output is 
not measured in physical units. That calls also for product level investigations. Our results, 
however, seem to support the standard link, as both efficiencies explain firm level market 
share, import competition has negative effect, and concentration had only limited effect on 
those market shares.   10 
Our approach has little to say on technology transfers, on spillover effect through trade or 
foreign direct investment. Our estimations showed that the economy went through quite a 
substantial restructuring. It is enough to recall that in all years the estimated production 
functions were structurally different from the previous and subsequent years, so no panel 
estimation was possible. It is supported by the high intensity of job reallocation. It is also 
showed that ownership really mattered, foreign owned firms had an impact on domestic 
markets and competitors, while domestic private owned firms kept pace with foreign owned 
ones. We do not, however, claim that our approach is able to deal with the endogeneity of 
ownership. 
We had little to add on financing aspects of transition, it is an important statement that the 
most efficient firms –small ones – have no easy access to finance, as investment and 
efficiency are not correlated with each other. It is known that this is the case in other 
countries, too. 
Conclusions 
Policies can have major impact on behaviour of firms. Uncertainties about policies, demand 
conditions and inefficient law enforcement affect both firms and markets. (Recent examples 
in Hungary are the huge minimum wage increases and the exchange rate policy.) 
Although we have documented an impressive performance during transition from planned to 
market economy in case of Hungary, there remain quite a few tasks to be addressed; the role 
of foreign owned firms, the endogeneity of ownership, the different forms of spillover 
(dissemination of technologies, its effect on labour turnover, etc.), better measurement of 
prices, output and productivity. 
Hungary will enter EU in 2004 and hopes to join eurozone by 2006-7. It is thought that it will 
be the major step towards market economy. Whether corporate sector and domestic markets 
will be able to cope with competitive pressure depends on the consistency of different 
policies and on domestic market conditions. As we demonstrated despite the fast growth 
reached by the end of 1990’s the adjustment of corporate behaviour to market and the 
restructuring of the corporate sector were very much an ongoing process even in 2000. It is 
questionable whether this adjustment process will lead to a sustainable corporate structure  
capable to cope with external and domestic challenges. 
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Technical appendix 
The sample for the job creation and destruction figures (Figures 1-6) is employment at all 
incorporated firms, and at non-incorporated ones that exceed a relatively low sales threshold. 
It excludes most family enterprises, especially agricultural ones. Gross job creation and 
destruction values were inflated by frequent changes of corporate identifier (tax file number) 
before 1995: firms with new identifier were treated as newly created ones, firms with 
discontinued identifier were assumed to be liquidated. 
Figures 7-16 are derived from estimates in Table 1 and 2; Figures 8 and 14 from Table 2, all 
other from Table 1. The sample for the estimates was drawn from the sample used for 
calculating job creation and destruction; however, it only covers a subset of all observations. 
Only firms employing more than 20 people (before 1996) and more than 10 people after are 
included; sampling was biased towards larger firms. 
The ownership of the firm is classified by majority ownership of the given type; state also 
includes ownership by local government. Firms are classified small if they employ less than 
50 people, their output or capital is below a given threshold value. An enterprise is large if it 
employs more than 500 people or its sales or capital is larger than a threshold. 
Mark-up estimates assume Cobb-Douglas technology with constant returns to scale; output 
variable is sales total. The difference of the Solow residuals from the production and the cost 
functions was the dependent variable of the regressions. Sectoral concentration was measured 
by the relative standard deviation of sales. Random individual and fixed time effect was used 
in the panel. One asterisk indicates significance at 0.05 probability level, while two asterisks 
indicate it at 0.01 level. The null hypothesis for µ is: µ =1. 
Tables 8 and 9 contain weighted averages. Firms are always classified according their status 
in the current year; thus the composition of the sample changes with variations in the 
corporate characteristics.  
Legend to Tables 1 and 2: The dependent variable (yt) is the log of value added at fixed 1992 
prices. L: average employment; K: fixed assets at fixed 1992 prices; σ is the overall standard 
error of the estimation, while σu/σv gives the ratio of the standard errors of the two 
disturbances. Inefficiency is weighted average inefficiency of all firms in sample in 
percentages. 
(market) Share: Sales of the firm divided by the market size, where market size is the sectoral 
production plus competing imports less exports, all measured at the NACE four-digit sectoral 
level. The sectoral classification of imports is based on the four-digit product classification; 
Import competition: The ratio of the sectoral imports to the above defined market size;   13 
Concentration: The share of the 3 largest firms in the sales total of the four-digit sector; 
Competitor's efficiency is the weighted average of u for all other firms in the four-digit 
sector. 
One asterisk indicates significance at 0.05 probability level, while two asterisks indicate it at 
0.01 level. The null hypothesis for the returns to scale is CRS. 
NACE-2  
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 
17 Manufacture of textiles and textile products 
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel and fur products 
19 Manufacture of leather products, luggage and footwear 
20 Manufacture of wood products (except furniture) 
21 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 
22 Publishing, printing and recorded media 
23 Manufacture of coke and petroleum products  
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
27 Manufacture of basic metals 
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products 
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment 
30 Manufacture of office machinery and computers 
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus 
32 Manufacture of radio, TV and communication equipment 
33 Manufacture of precision and optical instruments 
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles and trailers 
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 
36 Manufacture of furniture 
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Table 1 
Estimation result for the entire sample 
Variable  1990   1991   1992   1993   1994   1995   1996   1997   1998   1999   2000  
P r o d u c t i o n                                   
Constant  1.50 **  1.70 **  0.67 **  0.75 **  0.46 **  0.18 **  0.18 **  0.26 **  0.38 **  0.29 **  0.22 ** 
yt-1  0.63 **  0.64 **  0.25 **  0.53 **  0.55 **  0.65 **  0.71 **  0.68 **  0.71 **  0.73 **  0.71 ** 
log(L)  0.00    -0.03 **  0.47 **  0.26 **  0.30 **  0.25 **  0.23 **  0.21 **  0.18 **  0.18 **  0.21 ** 
log(K)  0.10 **  0.05 **  0.15 **  0.11 **  0.11 **  0.11 **  0.09 **  0.11 **  0.10 **  0.10 **  0.11 ** 
Σ  0.92 **  1.15 **  0.93 **  0.89 **  0.77 **  0.72 **  0.73 **  0.70 **  0.71 **  0.70 **  0.68 ** 
σu/σv  1.08 **  1.21 **  1.28 **  1.24 **  1.25 **  1.04 **  1.31 **  1.02 **  1.13 **  1.26 **  1.15 ** 
Return  to  scale  0.29 **  0.06 **  0.83 **  0.78 **  0.92 **  1.02    1.07 **  1.02    0.96 **  1.05 **  1.10 ** 
Nob  4515   5082   5144   8472   9704   10075   10298   11409   13173   13291   12963  
y   3.94   3.36   3.26   3.19   3.24  3.15  3.08  2.99  2.92  2.90  2.92  
σy  1.26   1.31   1.31   1.34   1.38  1.45  1.49  1.49  1.52  1.56  1.59  
R
2  0.64   0.52   0.69   0.73   0.80  0.83  0.85  0.85  0.86  0.88  0.88  
Inefficiency  -30.19   -36.08   -30.33   -30.75   -30.31   -28.49   -30.91   -27.22   -27.36   -28.59   -28.48  
M a r k e t   s h a r e                                   
Constant  -0.01   -0.01 * -0.02  **  0.00   -0.02  **  0.01    0.00    -0.02    -0.04  **  0.00    -0.01  ** 
Sharet-1  0.91 **  0.91 **  0.60 **  0.91 **  0.60 **  0.94 **  0.83 **  0.38 **  0.56 **  0.97 **  1.00 ** 
Own  efficiency  0.83 **  0.71 **  1.67 **  1.07 **  1.57 **  1.22 **  1.01 **  2.08 **  1.76 **  1.09 **  0.87 ** 
Competitors’ efficiency  -0.03    -0.03  * -0.07  ** -0.01   -0.06  **  0.03    -0.01   -0.07 * -0.09  ** -0.01   -0.05  ** 
Import  penetration  0.02    0.00    -0.02 **  -0.01    -0.01 **  0.00    -0.01 **  -0.02 **  -0.03 **  -0.01 **  0.00   
concentration  0.01   0.02  **  0.06  **  0.02   0.04  ** 0.01  ** 0.02  ** 0.06  ** 0.13  ** 0.02  * 0.01  
y   0.02   0.01   0.02   0.02   0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  
σy  0.08   0.07   0.07   0.12   0.09  0.10  0.09  0.09  0.10  0.10  0.11  
SEE  0.02   0.02   0.05   0.08   0.05  0.05  0.03  0.07  0.07  0.04  0.03  
R
2  0.93   0.86   0.40   0.55   0.72  0.75  0.84  0.40  0.40  0.86  0.91  
White-hetero  817 **  2922 **  830 **  40 **  6914 **  338 **  4017 **  2752 **  2203 **  2391 **  3806 ** 
Reset y
2, y
3  81 **  428 **  64 **  9 **  3531 **  38 **  694 **  6850 **  172 **  107 **  497 ** 
Profit  rate  0.31   0.44   0.32   0.17   0.12  0.17  0.17  0.14   0  0.24  0.22  
I n v e s t m e n t   r a t e                                   
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Table 2 
Estimation results for manufacturing 
Variable  1990   1991   1992   1993   1994  1995  1996  1997  1998   1999   2000   
P r o d u c t i o n                                        
Constant  1.36  **  1.31  **  0.61  **  0.78  **  0.49  ** 0.23  ** 0.15  ** 0.27  ** 0.36  ** 0.24  ** 0.23  ** 
yt-1  0.59  **  0.48  **  0.29  **  0.49  **  0.48  ** 0.60  ** 0.67  ** 0.62  ** 0.63  ** 0.68  ** 0.69  ** 
log(L)  0.01   0.11  **  0.47  **  0.25  **  0.31  ** 0.25  ** 0.23  ** 0.25  ** 0.20  ** 0.20  ** 0.19  ** 
log(K)  0.17  **  0.15  **  0.16  **  0.17  **  0.17  ** 0.15  ** 0.12  ** 0.15  ** 0.16  ** 0.14  ** 0.14  ** 
σ  0.91  **  1.14  **  0.92  **  0.87  **  0.77  ** 0.66  ** 0.66  ** 0.70  ** 0.64  ** 0.68  ** 0.59  ** 
σu/σv  1.10  **  1.49  **  1.50  **  1.69  **  1.40  ** 0.90  ** 1.16  ** 1.25  ** 1.13  ** 1.40  ** 1.12  ** 
Return  to  scale  0.44  **  0.50  **  0.89  **  0.84  **  0.93  ** 1.01  1.08  ** 1.05  ** 0.99  1.07  ** 1.08  ** 
Nob  1644   1613   1825   2834   3334  3523  3604  3972  4508   4539   4446   
y   3.79   3.19   3.27   3.30   3.40  3.38  3.35  3.24  3.22  3.22  3.28   
σy  1.35   1.33   1.34   1.42   1.46  1.52  1.55  1.57  1.57  1.62  1.64   
R
2  0.70   0.58   0.73   0.80   0.84  0.86  0.88  0.88  0.89  0.89  0.91   
Inefficiency  -30.32   -40.20   -27.70   -31.85   -30.20   -25.33   -28.23   -27.72   -25.80    -28.35    -26.02   
Market  share                                       
Constant  -0.01  0.00   -0.02  0.01  ** 0.00  0.01  * 0.00   -0.01   -0.07  ** 0.00    -0.03  * 
Sharet-1  0.90  **  1.03  **  0.45  **  0.95  **  0.96  ** 1.02  ** 0.87  ** 0.25  ** 0.50  ** 0.93  ** 1.01  ** 
Own  efficiency  1.21  **  1.00   1.66  **  1.08  **  1.42  ** 2.19  ** 1.83  ** 2.38  ** 3.45  ** 1.64  ** 1.74  ** 
Competitors’ efficiency  -0.04    -0.02    -0.06   -0.02   -0.07  ** 0.03   -0.02   -0.05   -0.24  **  -0.01    -0.12  ** 
Import  penetration  -0.01   -0.02   -0.03  ** 0.00   -0.01  0.00   -0.01  **  -0.03  **  -0.07  **  -0.01  ** 0.00   
concentration  0.00   0.01   0.04  **  0.01   0.01  0.01  0.03  ** 0.08  ** 0.17  ** 0.02  0.01   
y   0.03   0.02   0.02   0.03   0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.04   
σy  0.09   0.08   0.07   0.09   0.09  0.09  0.09  0.12  0.13  0.13  0.14   
SEE  0.03   0.03   0.05   0.03   0.03  0.03  0.04  0.10  0.11  0.05  0.05   
R
2  0.92   0.89   0.35   0.91   0.85  0.92  0.77  0.27  0.32  0.88  0.89   
White-hetero  340 **  998 **  265 **  1086 **  982 **  878 **  196 **  352 **  639  **  2602  **  1540  ** 
Reset y
2, y
3  35 **  210 **  21 **  123 **  171 **  134 **  79 **  1800 **  302  **  284  **  218  ** 
Profit  rate  0.33   0.48   0.38   0.46   0.39  0.39  0.40  0.40  0.18  0.23  0.35   
Investment  rate       0.15  0.18     0.14  0.22  0.14      0.15       
 Table 3 
Estimated mark-up, random effects, 2 digits level 
 1993-6  1997-2000 
Nace Nob    µ   R
2 Nob  µ   R
2 
15 1424  1.39    **  0.44 2026  1.46    **  0.54 
16  14  1.51    *  0.73  22  2.25  **  0.79 
17 320  1.26    **  0.33 554  1.31    **  0.34 
18 719  1.13    **  0.16 979  1.14    **  0.18 
19 295  1.21    **  0.24 419  1.19    **  0.20 
20 343  1.36    **  0.37 567  1.42    **  0.49 
21 147  1.55    **  0.60 196  1.29    **  0.43 
22 509  1.35    **  0.43 772  1.36    **  0.46 
24 322  1.50    **  0.59 450  1.64    **  0.56 
25 484  1.34    **  0.47 819  1.42    **  0.47 
26 423  1.39    **  0.45 588  1.40    **  0.52 
27 140  1.37    **  0.47 239  1.34    **  0.45 
28 918  1.29    **  0.37 1854  1.28    **  0.31 
29 917  1.29    **  0.30 1473  1.26    **  0.34 
30 39  1.69    **  0.60 75  1.47    **  0.58 
31 381  1.39    **  0.53 565  1.20    **  0.27 
32 191  1.42    **  0.37 313  1.28    **  0.35 
33 241  1.53    **  0.54 363  1.19    **  0.29 
34 155  1.47    **  0.44 311  1.31    **  0.44 
35  55  1.20  **  0.32  90  1.15  **  0.18 
36 387  1.23    **  0.31 564  1.23    **  0.31 




Estimated mark-up, varying coefficients, random effects, 1993-6 
Nace  constant  Imp comp  foreign  Rel sd of sales  R
2 Wald-test  µ  
15  0.29    **  5.02    0.02    -0.01    0.44  1.91    1.39     ** 
17  0.17    **  -0.73    0.15    **  0.01    0.34  11.06    *  1.30     ** 
18  0.22    **  -11.88    *  0.06    *  -0.01    0.16  11.10    *  1.15     ** 
19  0.30   16.14   -0.04   -0.08    0.24  3.6   1.22        ** 
20  0.34    **  -2.4    0.04    -0.03    0.36  2.38    1.36     ** 
21  0.39    **  -0.16    0.24    **  -0.03    0.6  22.07    **  1.70     ** 
22  0.31    **  -23.09    **  -0.03    0    0.43  15.63    **  1.35     ** 
24  0.20    **  -10.95    *  0.17    **  0.06    **  0.6  36.60    **  1.55     ** 
25  0.43    **  7.03    -0.04    -0.07    **  0.45  18.04    **  1.37     ** 
26  0.49    **  -6.1    0.07    *  -0.10    **  0.47  26.24    **  1.44     ** 
27  0.22    **  -6.97    -0.05    0.05    0.49  4.91    1.36     ** 
28  0.22    **  -1.31    0.10    **  0    0.37  16.78    **  1.30     ** 
29  0.36    **  -22.53    **  0.11    **  -0.03    0.33  49.02    **  1.31     ** 
30  0.46    **  24.06    0.05    -0.05    0.56  1.27    1.99     ** 
31  0.40    **  -12.45    *  0    -0.02    *  0.53  11.46    **  1.41     ** 
32  -0.18    -14.47    0.27    **  0.11    **  0.46  33.60    **  1.62     ** 
33  0.29    6.17    0.15    **  0    0.56  12.74    **  1.54     ** 
34  0.48    **  -33.65    **  0.23    **  -0.04    **  0.65  120.69    **  1.39     ** 
35  0.31    -27.46    -0.11    -0.02    0.37  11.83    **  1.25     ** 
36  0.05    9.61    0.16    **  0.02    0.36  31.62    **  1.23     ** 
37  0.41   0  0.04   -0.09    0.63 0.41   1.30        **   25 
Table 5 
Estimated markup, varying coefficients, random effects, 1997-2000 
Nace  constant  Imp comp  foreign  Rel sd of sales  R
2 Wald-test  µ  
15  0.20   **  -11.79    *  0.01    0.04    **  0.55  44.36    **  1.46    ** 
16  -11.46    -1791    0.29    **  12.08    0.85  10.55    *  2.49    ** 
17  0.22   **  -9.25    *  -0.04    0.02    *  0.35  8.04    *  1.31    ** 
18  0.30   **  -28.97    **  0.06    **  -0.01    0.19  35.38    **  1.15    ** 
19  0.37   *  9.75    -0.07    *  -0.07    **  0.22  20.68    **  1.20    ** 
20  0.28   **  4.19    0.07    *  0    0.49  4.73    1.43    ** 
21  0.46    **  -13.43  0.02   -0.04      *  0.49 6.34  1.34      ** 
22  0.47   **  -12.61    0.17    **  -0.06    **  0.51  75.31    **  1.39    ** 
24  0.38    ** -5.5  0.04   0.01   0.56 2.41  1.67      ** 
25  0.51   **  -42.61    **  0.07    **  0    0.51  70.23    **  1.40    ** 
26  0.39   **  -20.12    **  -0.04    -0.02    0.54  33.89    **  1.40    ** 
27  0.04    13.97    *  -0.01    0.06    **  0.47  15.46    **  1.34    ** 
28  0.16   **  -3.11    0.07    **  0.02    0.32  21.70    **  1.28    ** 
29  0.28   **  -13.36    **  0.03    0    0.34  14.90    **  1.27    ** 
30  0.59   **  -10.61    0.07    -0.03    *  0.58  7.80    *  1.52    ** 
31  0.34   **  -22.54    **  -0.02    0    0.28  12.81    **  1.21    ** 
32  0.75   **  -26.16    *  -0.04    -0.05    **  0.37  15.25   **  1.33    ** 
33  0.04  -1.1  0.08   0.03   0.29 4.65  1.20      ** 
34  -0.27    -3.02    0.08    *  0.15    **  0.46  16.61  **  1.30    ** 
35  -0.06    60.03    **  0.32    *  -0.02    0.47  48.08  **  1.23    ** 
36  0.29    **  -3.02   -0.02   -0.02   0.31 2.27  1.24      ** 
37  0.80   *  0    -0.25    **  -0.15    0.68  14.93  **  1.49    ** 
 
Table 6 
Sample means of large exporting firms 
Variable  1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Entire sample        
  Number  of  observations  508 498 520 532 677 579 
  Employment  1968 1961 1695 1437  966  796 
 Employment (% change)  -2.1  -3.9  -11.2  -12.8  -18.6  -21 
 Labour cost (% change)  4.8  23.9  17  2.5  -3.9  21 
 Production (% change)  1.6  -0.2  -4.4  -14.2  -31.2  -9.9 
 Profit margin (%)   4.2  2.6  2  0  -3.9  -18.5 
Change of production > 0                   
  Number  of  observations  350 211 187 109 133 145 
  Employment  1979 1837 1583 1284  785  710 
 Employment (% change)  -1.1  -2.5  -6.7  -1.1  -4.7  -1.6 
 Labour cost (% change)  5.7  26.2  12.5  11.8  6.7  30.3 
  Production  (%  change)  9.3 10.6 10.1 13.5 27.5  100 
 Profit margin (%)   4.6  3.1  3.2  3.5  2.7  -2.6 
Change of production ≤ 0                   
  Number  of  observations  158 287 333 423 544 434 
  Employment  1943 2053 1759 1477 1010  824 
 Employment (% change)  -4.2  -4.8  -13.3  -15.1  -20.8  -25.3 
 Labour cost (% change)  2.8  22.2  19.6  0  -6.6  17.6 
 Production (% change)  -7.9  -7.1  -10  -22.6  -37.2  -35.2 
 Profit margin (%)   3.2  2.3  1.3  -0.8  -5.5  -23.8 
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Table 7 
Sample means of large exporting firms 
Variable 1989  1990  1991  1992 
No foreign owner       
 Number of observations  507  497  556  433 
 Employment  1627  1375  957  857 
 Employment (% change)  -11.3  -12.9  -21.7  -23.4 
 Labour cost (% change)  17.3  2.3  -3.7  25.3 
 Production (% change)  -4.5  -14.1  -33.5  -9 
 Profit margin (%)   1.9  -0.2  -5.4  -20.4 
Small foreign ownership (< 25%)      
 Number of observations  11  23  39  18 
 Employment  3381  2364  1651  968 
 Employment (% change)  -12.7  -14.8  2.7  -14 
 Labour cost (% change)  9.3  4  -17.4  -5 
 Production (% change)  -3.3  -18.2  -28.2  -31.4 
 Profit margin (%)   2.9  2.6  -0.6  -63.8 
Important foreign owner (25-50%)      
 Number of observations  2  9  49  48 
 Employment  9796  2746  714  540 
 Employment (% change)  -4.4  -6  -7.3  -9.7 
 Labour cost (% change)  0.8  3.7  -3.5  18 
 Production (% change)  -0.1  -10.3  -2.7  -27.1 
 Profit margin (%)  8.5  2  4.6  -8.5 
Majority foreign owner       
 Number of observations    3  33  80 
 Employment    700  685  579 
 Employment (% change)    -7.9  -2.9  -7.2 
 Labour cost (% change)    32.9  12.2  14.1 
 Production (% change)    11.2  -9.2  0.5 
 Profit margin (%)     5.8  5.5  -3.9 
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Table 8  
Sample means of all firms 
Variable    1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Entire sample            
Number  of  observations  8139 10575 11386 11721 12097 14054 14644 14384 14018 
  Employment  182 127 135 125 120 105 104 102 102 
  Employment  (%  change)  -15  -11.8 -0.4 -8.4 -3.5 -1.2  1.3 -2.2 -0.3 
  Labour  cost  (%  change)    5.9 7.7 3.7  -9.3  -4.7 2.9 3.8 6.8 4.5 
  Output  (%  change)  -16.3 1.1 8.7 0.4 3.6  10  14.2  12.7  10.6 
  Export  share  (%)  15.2 13.9 14.6 18.2  20 24.2 26.3 27.6 27.8 
  Profit  margin  (%)  -7.3  -5.7  -0.6 0.7 1.1 2.5 2.3 2.6 2.5 
  Inefficiency  (%)  -58.3 -54.5 -47.7 -41.3 -45.8 -39.7 -41.6 -42.8 -40.2 
Change of output > 0           
Number  of  observations  3081 5270 6252 4973 5202 6754 8741 7565 6897 
  Employment  134 120 135 138 125 110 110 120 123 
  Employment  (%  change)  6.6  1  13.9  4 4.7 7.2 8.1 5.1 8.1 
 Labour cost (% change)   10  12.9  5.8  -4.2  0  12.2  4.5  8.7  8.3 
  Output  (%  change)  79.7  39 29.4 26.2 28.6 33.6 32.8 31.8 26.3 
 Export share (%)  17.2  15.6  16.6  23.8 23.3 30.4 28.1 28.1 32.7 
  Profit  margin  (%)  -1.9  -3.4 0.3 2.6 2.6 3.6 3.3 2.9 3.2 
  Inefficiency  (%)  -46.9 -43.2 -39.1 -33.4 -35.7 -33.3 -35.8 -35.7 -33.6 
Change of output ≤ 0           
Number  of  observations  5058 5305 5134 6748 6895 7300 5903 6819 7121 
  Employment  212 134 134 116 116 100  96  82  82 
  Employment  (%  change)  -21.1 -20.6 -13.6 -17.1  -9.2  -8.4  -8.5 -12.2 -10.4 
 Labour cost (% change)   3.1  2.3  1.1  -13.2  -8.4  -5.7  2.5  4.6  0.6 
  Output  (%  change)  -39.6  -25 -18.2 -20.8 -17.2 -18.3 -16.5 -15.8 -16.6 
  Export  share  (%)  13.8 11.8  11 11.5 15.7 12.9 21.7 26.7 17.1 
  Profit  margin  (%)  -11.1 -8.5 -2.4 -1.7 -0.9  0.4  0  2  0.9 
  Inefficiency  (%)  -65.6  -66 -58.3 -47.3 -53.7 -45.7 -50.4 -51.1 -46.9 
Private           
Number  of  observations  22 1460 1872 2073 2141 2307 2353 2247 2200 
  Employment  85 118 143 143 137 133 158 130 131 
  Employment  (%  change)  -27.9  -15.8 -4.1 -6.4  -5  -2 -1.3 -6.6 -4.9 
 Labour cost (% change)   11.4  9.3  6.8  -7.8  -5.9  -0.5  5.6  8.4  5 
  Output  (%  change)  -21.1 0.7 4.1  -4.7  0  -0.7 7.8 3.1 6.6 
  Export  share  (%)  1.6  17 15.1 14.9 13.7 14.3 15.1 13.8 14.9 
  Profit  margin  (%)  -7.6  -3  -1.3 1 1  1.7  -0.4 1  1.1 
  Inefficiency  (%)  -64.5 -51.2 -45.7 -40.1  -46 -39.6 -41.4 -42.3 -39.4 
Foreign           
Number  of  observations  699 1239 1406 1535 1672 2114 2285 2270 2195 
  Employment    157 158 160 186 192 176 192 198 210 
 Employment (% change)   -0.9  -2.1  4  2.5  1  4.3  6.6  3  8.3 
 Labour cost (% change)   11.6  5.4  6.4  -6.5  -0.3  3.6  5.4  8  5.1 
  Output  (%  change)    14.9 19.3 27.8  8.7 12.9  24 21.4 21.3 15.2 
 Export share (%)   15.9  17.1  20.4 26.6 31.7 37.7 37.5 39.6 39.1 
  Profit  margin  (%)    -5.5  -2.8  -0.7 0.9 2.8 3.6  4 3.5 3.3 
  Inefficiency  (%)    -43.9 -43.1 -37.2 -35.4 -38.8 -33.8 -35.7 -37.7 -35.4 
State           
Number  of  observations    1537  1361  1144 981 792 724 706 677 631 
  Employment    472 383 494 444 472 424 338 407 415 
 Employment (% change)   -17.1  -11.1  0.4  -14.9  -5.7  -5.5  -3.3  -2.7  -2.4 
 Labour cost (% change)   15.3  21.1  12.9  -6.9  1.7  2.6  9.9  5.2  3.5 
 Output (% change)   -14.7  -4.7  0.5  -2.5  -1.8  2.5  1.3  3.9  5.9 
  Export  share  (%)    16.3 13.9 14.1 16.1 14.3 13.9 11.9 10.8  13 
 Profit margin (%)   -8.5  -11.1  -0.4  -1  -3.9  -2  -2.6  -0.4  -1 
  Inefficiency  (%)    -59 -56.9  -50 -44.6 -48.8 -42.7 -43.6 -43.9 -42.8   28 
 
Table 8 continued           
Variable    1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Other           
Number  of  observations    5470 6073 6537 6751 7097 8484 8914 8818 8676 
  Employment    113 69 64 60 57 48 48 47 45 
  Employment  (%  change)    -15.1  -15.1 -6.1 -5.3 -3.7 -1.2  1.3 -3.4 -3.9 
 Labour cost (% change)   3  4.9  -0.3  -11.4  -7.2  4  1.5  5.4  4 
 Output (% change)   -26.9  -4.9  6.1  -3.4  -3  1.4  10.1  2.5  2.5 
 Export share (%)   12.7  7.9  6.8  9.7  10.9  11.7  12  11.7  12.2 
  Profit  margin  (%)    -7  -1.3  -0.6 1.7 2.5  2  2 1.9 2.2 
  Inefficiency  (%)    -60 -57.2 -50.2 -42.7 -47.2  -41  -43 -44.2 -41.5 
Small firms           
Number  of  observations    4909 7276 7788 8305 8690  10527  10872  10672  10395 
  Employment    40 36 35 35 34 31 32 32 31 
  Employment  (%  change)    -28.2  -10.6 -5.9 -7.5  -6 -2.4  0.9 -5.2 -6.1 
 Labour cost (% change)   4.8  7.1  3.8  -10.5  -5.2  3  2.9  6.7  4.5 
 Output (% change)   -13.3  7.2  11.2  -2.5  -3.8  3.3  13.8  2.6  3.5 
  Export  share  (%)    11.9 10.6  8.7 10.8 10.9 16.1  18 16.4 16.7 
 Profit margin (%)   -5.1  -3.6  -2.1  0  0.2  1.1  0.8  1  1.1 
  Inefficiency  (%)    -58.1  -54 -47.9 -41.5  -46 -39.9 -41.7 -43.2 -40.6 
Medium sized firms           
Number  of  observations    2647 2776 2953 2774 2769 2865 3054 2988 2897 
  Employment    178 157 152 154 152 147 143 138 137 
 Employment (% change)   -20.9  -19.7  -7.1  -13.9  -3.3  -1.1  0.6  -2  -0.5 
  Labour  cost  (%  change)    6.7 9.3 1.7  -7  -5 2.2 5.7 6.6 4.1 
 Output (% change)   -31.1  -8.3  4.1  -2  -2.3  1.6  6.7  2.9  4.5 
  Export  share  (%)    10.8 11.4 12.3 15.5  17 17.7 19.4 21.2 21.6 
  Profit  margin  (%)    -10.6  -5  -2.4 0.4 1.5 2.2 0.2 1.7 1.7 
  Inefficiency  (%)    -62.5 -57.5 -48.7 -41.8 -46.2 -39.9 -42.2 -42.7 -39.7 
Large firms           
Number  of  observations    583 523 645 642 638 662 718 724 726 
  Employment    1401 1235 1265 1170 1157 1101 1032  987  975 
  Employment  (%  change)    -7 -6.1  5.8 -5.3 -2.5 -0.7  1.9 -0.9  2.7 
  Labour  cost  (%  change)    13.2 9.7 9.9  -5.4 1.3 3.9 6.7 8.5 5.4 
 Output (% change)   -9.7  3  9.4  2.1  8  15.3  16.6  18.8  14.4 
 Export share (%)   17.7  15.9  17.3 21.5 23.7 28.9 31.1 32.9 32.8 
  Profit  margin  (%)    -6.7  -6.6 0.4  1 1.2  3 3.5 3.3 3.1 
  Inefficiency  (%)    -42.6 -44.1 -40.7 -37.2 -41.2 -35.2 -36.8 -38.7 -36.2 
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Table 9 
Sample means of manufacturing firms 
Variable    1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Entire sample           
Number  of  observations    2639 3297 3726 3849 3949 4556 4845 4757 4657 
  Employment    206 158 153 151 147 134 134 134 133 
 Employment (% change)   -11.2  -12.3  -5  -1.7  -1.6  2  3.2  -1.2  2.6 
 Labour cost (% change)   9.1  15.9  5.7  -5.3  -3.6  0  6.2  7.6  8 
  Output  (%  change)    -0.2  6.6 10.6 10.3  7.4 19.2 16.7 19.2 16.7 
  Export  share  (%)    25.5 26.3 27.5  33 37.5 44.7 49.5 53.3 52.1 
  Profit  margin  (%)    -8.5  -2.6  -0.6 2.2 2.8 3.8  4 3.9 3.7 
  Inefficiency  (%)    -60.6 -58.4 -48.9 -35.3 -39.3 -42.7 -37.6 -42.6 -34.6 
Change of output > 0           
Number  of  observations    1102 1867 2257 2011 1850 2342 2918 2440 2741 
  Employment    159 157 157 161 153 158 127 139 155 
 Employment (% change)   3.2  -6.1  2.1  6  7.8  9.1  12  8.9  10.2 
  Labour  cost  (%  change)    14.4  23.3 5.7 1.2 3.3 6.4 9.3 9.6  11.6 
  Output  (%  change)    87.4 31.1 25.1 25.5 36.2 38.6 42.2 44.8 30.2 
  Export  share  (%)    25.5 24.5 28.3  36 49.1  50 59.6 61.6 60.4 
  Profit  margin  (%)    -3.3  -1.1 0.2 2.8 4.7 4.6  5 4.5 4.4 
  Inefficiency  (%)    -46.8 -46.1 -40.4 -29.9 -31.2 -35.3 -32.5 -34.9 -29.7 
Change of output ≤ 0           
Number  of  observations    1537 1430 1469 1838 2099 2214 1927 2317 1916 
  Employment    240 159 148 139 141 108 144 128 103 
  Employment  (%  change)    -16.8 -19.2 -14.6 -10.1  -9.2  -7.3  -6.7 -10.7 -10.7 
  Labour  cost  (%  change)    5.2 6.4 5.8  -12.6  -9.5  -6.5 1.3 5.2 2.4 
  Output  (%  change)    -35.7 -22.1 -20.4 -14.6  -12 -20.5 -14.1 -11.2 -15.6 
  Export  share  (%)    25.4 29.6 25.3 27.1 25.5 28.7 32.1  41 31.5 
  Profit  margin  (%)    -14.1  -5.3  -2.8 0.9 0.8 1.2 2.5  3 1.7 
  Inefficiency  (%)    -69.7 -75.3 -62.2 -41.5 -46.5 -50.7 -45.4 -50.9 -41.9 
Private           
Number  of  observations    5 504 687 748 783 844 865 821 795 
  Employment    133 170 192 203 199 194 202 184 188 
  Employment  (%  change)    -27.9  -24.9 -5.9 -1.6 -2.9 -0.4  0 -8.2  -5 
 Labour cost (% change)   19  15.1  12  -1.7  -5.8  -1.5  6.6  12.3  4.1 
  Output  (%  change)    -15.2 3.1 5.5  7  -0.7 1.9 3.3 0.9  8 
  Export  share  (%)    3.2 29.3 24.6 25.2 23.9 26.8 28.9  28 31.1 
  Profit  margin  (%)    -12.3  -3.5  -0.2 2.4  1 0.7  -1.1 0.8 0.8 
  Inefficiency  (%)    -56.9 -57.5 -46.4 -34.6 -40.6 -43.7 -38.8 -44.7  -35 
Foreign           
Number  of  observations    359 602 746 823 887  1080  1180  1183  1152 
  Employment    179 205 196 211 219 209 230 243 254 
  Employment  (%  change)    -2.1  -4.2 2.7 2.7 2.9 6.3 7.5 4.1  10.4 
  Labour  cost  (%  change)    13.3  11.9 7.3 0.2 0.5 6.4 3.9 7.6 8.3 
  Output  (%  change)    18.8 22.8 27.6  19 19.4 34.5 23.6 26.3 19.6 
  Export  share  (%)    28.2 28.2  33  42 51.5 61.4 59.4 62.9 61.1 
  Profit  margin  (%)    -5.5  -3.5  0 2.1 4.3  5 5.5 4.8 4.4 
  Inefficiency  (%)    -45.5 -48.1 -39.8 -32.7 -34.5  -38 -34.4 -38.9 -31.7 
State           
Number  of  observations    566 384 288 209 125  89  78  71  61 
  Employment    500 456 489 493 528 402 301 329 321 
 Employment (% change)   -18.8  -14.5  -12.8  -8.5  -9  -2.8  -10.5  -4.4  -1 
 Labour cost (% change)   17.8  27.1  15.2  -13.1  5.7  -1.9  32.3  3.7  11.2 
 Output (% change)   1.6  -2.2  0.3  3  -2.9  30.9  -6.6  -4.2  19.3 
 Export share (%)   23.4  26.2  26.9 28.2 21.6 44.1 36.4 37.3 28.2 
 Profit margin (%)   -7.9  -2  -1.8  1.9  -0.3  -5  2.1  -0.9  2.7 
  Inefficiency  (%)    -62 -66.3 -57.9 -39.2 -45.3 -51.8 -40.6 -53.5 -38.5 
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Table 9 continued           
Variable    1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Other           
Number  of  observations    1531 1635 1828 1910 2002 2367 2556 2525 2517 
  Employment    115 73 69 67 70 60 59 62 58 
 Employment (% change)   0  -7.5  -3.4  -1.4  -2.4  1.1  2.1  -3  -2 
 Labour cost (% change)   5  16  0.2  -9  -6.2  -4.3  6.8  5.5  9.4 
  Output  (%  change)    -14.6 4.9 6.9 5.9  -1.9 3.8 7.2 2.3 9.1 
  Export  share  (%)    30.4 20.6 17.2 21.1 23.7 22.3 21.8 23.6  23 
  Profit  margin  (%)    -13.7  -1.6  -1.2 1.5 2.2 2.6  3 2.8 2.6 
  Inefficiency  (%)    -64 -61.2 -52.3 -36.4 -40.5 -44.4 -38.5 -43.4 -35.8 
Small firms           
Number  of  observations    1623 2147 2378 2516 2585 3112 3263 3108 3012 
  Employment    47 42 40 40 41 39 38 39 37 
  Employment  (%  change)    -20.5 -6.5 -3.7  -2 -2.7  0.2  0.2 -4.2 -4.5 
 Labour cost (% change)   8.2  15  9  -5.8  -5.4  -1.3  6.3  7.8  8.4 
  Output  (%  change)    -21.4 6.7  12.6 7.3  -2.6 5.4  10.9 2.8 2.4 
  Export  share  (%)    14.9 15.9 14.9 20.7 20.1 21.8  24 25.8 24.6 
  Profit  margin  (%)    -5.6  -3.8  -3.2 0.2 0.8 1.7 2.5 2.5 1.7 
  Inefficiency  (%)    -60.1 -59.5  -49 -35.4 -39.5  -43 -37.6 -42.9  -35 
Medium sized firms           
Number  of  observations    772  916 1043 1002 1044 1116 1231 1308 1300 
  Employment    187 172 166 171 170 166 164 157 155 
 Employment (% change)   -18.1  -19.8  -2.9  -0.1  -1.6  2  2.2  -1.4  0.1 
 Labour cost (% change)   10.2  16.7  -2.4  -4.8  -3.5  1.6  5.4  5.9  7.6 
  Output  (%  change)    -21.7 5.2  11.7 8.8 1.7 3.5 8.2 2.8  10.5 
  Export  share  (%)    23.9  23 24.9 29.3 32.3 32.8 36.8 38.1 38.3 
  Profit  margin  (%)    -10.7  -4.7  -2.5 0.2 1.1  2 1.7 2.2 2.2 
  Inefficiency  (%)    -64.9 -58.3 -49.8 -35.4  -39 -42.7 -37.9 -42.5 -34.5 
Large firms           
Number  of  observations    244 234 305 331 320 328 351 341 345 
  Employment    1324  1174 989 929 926 927 916 916 893 
 Employment (% change)   -5.1  -9.4  -6.6  -2.5  -1.2  2.8  5  0.1  7.2 
 Labour cost (% change)   11.8  20.7  11.8  -3.7  7.4  4.4  7.2  11  7.4 
  Output  (%  change)    11.3  7 10.1 11.1 10.7  26 19.5 24.9 19.4 
 Export share (%)   27.3  28.9  30.1 35.8 41.2 50.9 55.9 59.9 58.1 
  Profit  margin  (%)    -8.3  -1.8 0.3  3 3.5 4.5 4.8 4.4 4.2 
  Inefficiency  (%)    -47.8  -50 -44.7 -34.1 -38.1 -39.9  -37 -40.8 -31.9 
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